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The impactof the colonialdevelopment, or exploitation, on
metropolitan or mothercountryeconomicgrowt!~ remainsa majorun-
resolvedissuein economichistoryand development economics. The
conventional wisdomseemsto assume a world in which the agricul-
turaland raw materialsurpluses of the colonialareasare used to
1/ fuel metropolitan industrial development.-
This paperanalyzesthe impactof the verysuccessful
Japanesecolonialdevelopment effortsin Koreaand Taiwanon
2/
omit growthin Japan.- The resultsof our analysissuggest
econ-
that
the importsof rice from the two colonialareas to Japanas the
resultof colonialagricultural development were, to a substantial
degree,responsible for the stagnation of Japaneseagriculture dur-
ing the interwar Years,thoughit contributed to industrial growth
by keeping-the industrial wage low and the returnto capitalhigh
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withoutcausingseriousdrainon foreigneXchange. The increased
supplYof colonialricedid not producean agricultural transforma-
tion comparable to thatof the 19thCenturyEngland,but it produced
agricultural stagnation and low farm income,whichwere to a large
extentresponsible for thegeneraleconomicand politicalinstability
of the interwar period.
Followingour analysisof the Japanesecolonialexperience
we suggestseveralhypotheses which shouldbe considered in account-
ing for the difference betweenJapaneseand Englishcolonialexper-
ience. Alsowe discussthe implications of the Japaneseexperience
for today’sdeveloping nationsin Asia and otherregionsin con-
nectionwith a massiveagricultural technology transfer, the so-called
“GreenRevolution.”
The analysisis basedon timeseriesdata for the period
1890-1937.We deliberately chose1890as the startingyear,because
the data before1890are much lessreliable,despitethe recent
attemptsto correct
Statistics of-
data after1890are
officialstatistics in The Lena-Term Economic
3/ since1868 (abbreviated as ~).- Even the ——
4/ subjectto criticism raisedby Nakamura.-
Althoughthe issuehas not yet been settled,we resortedto LTES
officialstatistics, since thoseare the only datawhichcan be used
for the kindof analysiswe made. We feel that the adequacyof the
data shouldbe checkednot only in termsof the deliberate text
critiqueof originaldocumentsbut also in terms of the plausibility
of the resultsof an analysiswhichuses the data in question.I. Empirical Observation and hypothesis
The rateof outputand productivity growthin Japaneseagri-
culturevariedwidelyduringthe 100yearsof “modernization”
followingthe startof theMeijiperiod(1068-1911).Four main per-
iods,sometimes referredto as “technical’fepochs” are frequently
identified (Table1). The firstwas a periodof rapidgrowthin
outputand productivity thatendedprior to 1920. Thiswas followed
by a periodof slowereconomicgrowthduringthe 1920’sand 1930’s.
The third“epoch”was theperiodof declineand recoveryassociated
with WorldWar 11. A fourthperiodof explosivegrowthin productiv-
5/ ity beganin the late 1940’sor early1950ts.- Outputand produc-
tivitytrends,bothfor riceand for the totalagricultural sector,
appearto havefollowedthe samegeneralpattern,reflecting the
dominantroleof rice in the agricultural economy.
The two decadesof agricultural stagnation whichfollowed
the rapidgrowthin agricultural outputand productivity priorto
WorldWar I has been a majorpuzzlein the historyof Japanese
6/ economicdevelopment.- It has been ass~rted,by Japanesescholars,
that importsof rice fromTaiwanand Korea,stimulated by the
transferof Japaneseproduction technology to the two colonialareas,
depressedricepricesand dampenedthe growthof productivity and
7/ An alternative hypothesis, farm incomesin metropolitan Japan.-
that the potentialof theMeijiperiodbiological technology had
been exhausted and thatthe new bio-chemical technology, that has4
Table1..-Annual percentage growthratesof output,inputsand pro-
ductivityin Japaneseagriculture in fourperiods
PhaseI Phase11 Phase111 PhaseIV
(J 8&?- (1917- (1937- (1947-
1917) 1937) 1947) 1957)
--.----------~~ percentper year~-------------
Q!LMMi:
Gross output 1.78
Net output 1.37
Conventional inputs:
Total inputs
Labor
Fixed capital
Includingbuilding
Excludingbuilding
V~riableinputs
Land acreagetotal
Paddyfield
Uplandfield
.28
.20
l43
1.66
2.93
.60
.27
1,02
Productivity ~ uni~~:
Conventional inputs 1.49
Labor 1.86J
Fixed capital
Including building 1.34
Excludingbuilding .11
Variableinputs -1.12
Land 1.17
.80
.69
,20
l 01
..52
1.24
1*15
.15
e34
.05
.27
- .44
- .45
a64
-2.79
-1.78
- .03
1.83
- .46
-1.44
-6.76
- .54
- .43
- .67
-2.77
-4.54
-2.35
-1.37
4.25
w’12.27
4.51
2.14
1.41
-1.36
3.05
5.84
2*76
.85
-6.73
4.14
Source: SaburaYamada,“Changesin Outputand in Conventional and Non-
conventional Inputsin JapaneseAgriculture since1880,” Food
ResearchInstitut
f3.w!Q!wi9 Vol” 7, NO. 3 (1967),pp. 371-=
Calculated fromdata in Tables1 and 2.!5
been so important in fuelingJapaneseagricultural growthduringthe
last two decadeswas not availablein the interwar period,also has
8/ ~/ been suggested.-
The sharpchangesin the rateof agricultural outputand
productivity growthfollowing WorldWar I are clearlyreflectedin
the variousindicators of riceproduction, productivity and price in
Table2. From 1890 to 1920,the area plantedin rice and theyield
per hectareplantedgrew respectively by 0.44 and 0.94percentper
Year. Totalproductionincreased by 1.38percentper year. In con-
trast,the growthratesdeclinedto 0.16 for area,0.24 for yield,
and 0.40 for production between1920and 1935.
Growth in production and productivity between1890-1920 was
accompanied by an increasein the priceof rice from42
metricton in 1890to 242~ in 1920,an annualcompoundrate of
growthof about6 percent. The internaltermsof trade,as measured
by the ricepricedeflatedby the generalprice index,was fatiorable
for agriculture immediately after1890and was relatively stablebe-
tween1095and 1915, The fact that the internaltermsof tradert?-
mainedst,able withoutan appreciable increasein rice importsfor
1900-1915indicates a relativebalancein the growthof agriculture
and industry,in theOhkawa-Rosovsky sense,duringthe “big spurt”
periodof industrialization in Japanfrom the Russo-Japanese War
10/ Farmers’real incomefrom riCe, (1904-1905) toWorldWar I.—
measuredas the totalvalueof rice production at the farm deflated
by the generalprice index,went up rapidly,mainlyas a resultof
growthin physicalproduction,N
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‘l%e Japaneseeconomyexperienced a sharpinflation during
WorldW:)r1. The wholesnleprice indexin ‘1’okyo more tharl doubled
bet,wwn1°13and 1919. Ricepricesrose to theirhighestlevelrela-
tive to the consumer price indexin 1913and to theirhighest
absolutelevelin 1919.
Stagnation of production and productivity coincided with the
declinein the priceof rice after1919. The termsof tradecontinued
to deteriorate and real incomefromrice to fall. This trendcon-
tinuedto the catastrophe of NoayoI{yoko (Agricultural Depression) in
1929-32. What were the factors“that accountedfor suchan epochal
change- fromrapiddevelopment untilapproximately 1920and the
stagnation duringthe interwar period? Emergenceof the stagnation
phase can partlybe ascribedto an unfavorable shiftin the demand
for agricultural products,especially such staplefoodsas rice.
Demandfor foodas well as for otherconsumers goodsdeclinedas a
resultof the declinein consum~rincomeresultingfrom the defla-
tionpolicyJapanadoptedin orderto returnto thegold standardat
the pre-warparity. Thereis also evidencethat the incomeelastic-
ity of demandfor riceand staplefoodsdeclinedas a resultof
urbanization and of changesin theoccupational distribution of the
11/ laborforce.— 12/ Labor’sshareof incometendedto decline.— Such
factorsshouldhaveworkedto slow down the shiftof the demand
scheduleto the right. We hypothesize, however,thateventsof
greatermagnitude, such as the exhaustion of technological potential
or the importation of colonialrice,must be soughtto explainchanges
of the magnitude observedbetweenthe two periods.8
The processof exploitation and exhaustion of technological
potentialbetweentheMeijiRestoration and 1920has been analyzed
13/ elsewhere, and will only be summarized brieflyhere,— The real key
to the successof Japaneseagricultural growthpriorto WorldWar I
restson the nation-wide diffusion of the stockof improvedtechni-
ques’, which had previously beenpartiallyblockedby feudalbarriers,
followingthe breakdown of feudalism at the timeof theMeiji
Restoration.BeforetheRestoration such techniques as highyielding
varietiesof seedsor betterseedlingpreparation were, thoughdis-
covered,restricted to smalllocalities due to the lackof communica-
tion facilities and the regulations of ~ (territory of the feudal
lord)and the villages. With the reformsof Meiji,farmerswere no
longerboundto the land. Moreover,theywere free to choosetheir
own cropsand methodsof farming. Exchangeof seedsand technical
information betweenregionswas encouraged by the government.The
nation-wide diffusionof bettertechniques broughta rapidrise in
yield per hectare-- the fruitof RonoGiiutsu(veteran farmers’
technique), whichwas primarilyorientedto achievingincreased land
productivity, with an adequatesupplyof fertilizer and the irriga-
tion networksinherited from the feudal~ system.
The diffusionof RonoGiiutsuthusbroughtabouta rise in
yieldand production, but it causedthe exhaustion of the initial
backlogof technology in the absenceof an adequateflow of new
technology.It is truethatnationaland prefectural experiment
stationswere established beforeagriculture enteredthe stagnation9
phaseand that theydid havesome impacton the supplyof new techno-
logy l But it wouldbe fair to say thatthe organized researchin
experiment stationsin thosedays contributed to the growthof agri-
culturalproductivity by exploiting the traditional potentialthrough
testing,selecting, and advocating the techniques, ratherthanby
14/ addingnew potential.——
The exploitation and the consequent exhaustion of the techno-
logicalbacklogcan best be visualized by the rapidincreasein the
percentageof areaplantedin Rono varieties(ricevarietiesselected
by veteranfarmers)for 1895-1915 and the saturationin the subsequent
period (Fig.1). The seed improvement indexin Table2 was calculated
in an attemptto quantifythe influence of diffusionof improvedseeds
on nationalaverageyield. This indexis basedon theweightedaver-
ages of the areasplantedin the respective varieties, usingas weights
the standardyieldsof variousvarieties. The standardyields,which
are fixedby regions,were basedon the reportsof comparative yield
testsat variousexperiment stations. The annualgrowthrate of this
indexdeclineddrastically from 1890-1920to 1920-1935, reflecting the
saturationin the spreadof improvedvarieties.
The exhaustion of the traditional technological potentialand
the consequent deceleration of growthin riceyieldsseem to haveco-
incidedwith the increasein demanddue to the boom of Wor!dWar
Il This forcedthe ricepriceto rise to an unprecedented level. The
impactof inflation ‘6nthe priceof rice causedseriousdisruptionin
urbanareasand culminated in the[<ome Sodo (RiceRiot)of 1918.10
I R6n6varieties
/
Experiment Station varieties A
.,9*= ..**. *99. m.*.. .....m... m..m....
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l“igure 1. Percentages of areaplantedof major improvedvarietiesin the totpl
areaplantedof rice,all perfectures.
Source:
YujiroHayamiand SaburoYamada,“Technological Progressof
Agriculture,” in L. R. Kleinand l{azushi Ohkawa (eds.),
EconomicGrowth: ~Japanese Ex~erience SinceNeiiiEra,
(llomewood, Illinois: Irwin,1968),AppendixTable5A,
pp. 159-160.11
The reactionof the government to theRice Riotwas to organize
programsto importrice fromthe overseasterritories of Koreaand
Taiwan,in orderto createa ricesurplusto exportto Japan,short-
run exploitation policiesinvolvedimporting sorghum(mile)from
Manchuriato Korea,forcingKoreanfarmersto substitute this lower
qualitygrainfor rice in domesticconsumption.A similarsqueeze
was alsopracticedin Taiwan,forcingTaiwanesefarmersto substitute
sweetpotatoes
on real income
commodities as
for rice in theirdiet. Thiswas enforcedby a squeeze
throughtaxationand government monopolysalesof such
liquor,tobaccoand salt. The longer-run programwas
to introduce development programsdesignedto increasethe yieldand
outputof rice in thosecolonialterritories.Under the program
titledSanmaiZoshokuKeikakq(RiceProduction Development Program), ——
the Japanesegovernmentinvestedin irrigation and water controland
in researchand extensionin orderto developand diffusehighyield-
ing Japaneserice varieties adaptedto the localecologyof Koreaand
15/ Taiwan.—— Successof this effortcreatedthe tremendous rice surplus
which floodedinto theJapanesemarket. As shownin Table3, within
20 yearsfrom 1915to 1935net importsof rice fromKorea to Japan
rose from 170 to
from Taiwanrose
of the inflowof
1,212thousand metrictonsper year,and net imports
from 113 to 705thousandmetrictons. As the result
colonialrice the net importof rice rose from5 to
16/ 20 percentof the domesticproduction.—
The successof the government programin developing Koreaand
Taiwanas majorsuppliersof rice to Japanshouldhavea major impactI I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I
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on rice pricesand production in Japan. Such largescale importsof
rice,a commoditycharacterized by a relativelyinelastic demand
schedule,couldbe expectedto lowertheprice and discourage the
productionof rice in Japan. A deterioration in thepriceand in the
termsof tradefor rice duringthisperiodwould appearto be a logical
consequence of the policiesdesignedto increaseimportsfromI{orea
and Taiwan.
Both themotivation and conq,equence
velopmentprogramare illustrated in Figure
of rice production and yieldper hectarein
of the colonialrice de-
2 whichcomparesthe trends
~?f
Japant Taiwanand Korea,-’
Both production and yieldper hectarein Koreaand Taiwanbegan to
take off in the 1920’swhen the growthdecelerated in Japan. This
seemsto reflectthe processwe have discussedso far: (a) The
Japanesegovernment launchedthe colonialrice development program
when pressedby the foodproblemarisingfrom the exhaustion of tech-
nologicalpotentialin Japaneseagriculture and risingfood demand
from n growingnonagricultural population,(b) The successof the
programin raisingrice production and productivity in the two
coloniespermittedlargescaleimportsof rice from these territories,
which in turndepressedthe price
tion of rice in Japan.
The data reviewedin this
hypothesisthat (a) the slow-down
fleetedin the slowerrise in the
and furtherdiscouraged the produc-
sectionappearsto supportthe
of technological progress,re-
seed improvement index,and (b) the14 ‘
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1: igure2, Indicesof totalproductio~~ and yieldper hectareof rice,
Japan,Koreaand Taiwan,fiveyearsmovingaverages,
1917-22= 100.
Source:
Japan-- LTllS vol. 9, pp. 166-167; NorimshoRuinenTokeihyQ
(Historical Statistics of Uinistryof Agriculture and
Forestry),(Tokyo,1945),p,24.
Korea-- ChosenSotokutuTokeihyo(Statistical YearbookQ
Govmnnmneral Korea),1925 issue(p. 94),1930 issue
(p.92). ‘—
Taiwan-- JCRll, TaiwanAgricultural Statistics, (Taipei,
1966),pp. 23-27.15
increasein importsof rice fromKoreaand Taiwanwere the two major
factorsunderlying the epochalturn in the growthtrendof ricepro-
18’ In the nextsectionwe ductionin Japanfollowing WorldWar I.——
attemptto assessthe quantitative significance of thesetwo factors.II. Quantitative Analysis
In orderto assessthe relativeinfluences of the two major
causes identified i.n the lastsectionon the epochal‘turn in the
Japaneserice economy,we presenttwo hypothetical or “counter-
factual”calculations to illustrate how production and pricewould
have changedafter1920. In Case 1 we assumethat the ratioof net
importsof rice to domesticproduction remainedthe same as in 1913-
17, In Case 2 we assume,in additionto the assumption of a constant
importratio,that the seed improvement indexcontinuedto grow at
the 1090-1920 rate.
Nodel
The basicmodel for such calculations is the equilibrium of
demandand supplY. We will use the notationfor the actualvaluesof
variablesas specifiedin Tables2 and 3; and identifythe llYpo-
theticalvalueswith a prime (’).
since the actualtotalsLIppl.Y of rice,(),can be considered
i.dential to tntaldem~rld, the equilibrium of d~mandand supplYcan be
writtenas:
(1) Q=(l+-k)z
where Q is totalconsumption, Z is domesticproduction, and k is the
ratioof net import(andinventory chanqe)to production.We assume
t.l]at the aboveequilibrium relationholdsat some actualprice,P, a!?d17
thatall equilibrium levelof consumption, imports,and production
couldbe specified at somehypothetical priceP’ as:
(2) Q’= (1 +k’)Z’
If we assumea typicalconstantelasticity demandfunctionas:
(3) Q=QoPq
,.
where incomeand otherdemandshiftersare includedin Qo, the rela-
tionbetweenQ and Q’ is:
(4)
where n is the priceelasticity of demandfor rice.
If we assumea constantelasticity supPIYfunctionas:
(5)
where supplyshiftersotherthan S are includedin 2., the relation
betweenZ andZ’ is:
(6)
where y is thepriceelasticity of supplY,S is the seed improvement
index,and ~ the elasticity of supplYwith respectto the seed improve-
ment index. Since the followingidentityholds,
(7) z ‘AY,18
whereA is the areaplantedin (hectares) and Y is the yieldPer
hectare(inmetrictons). If we assumean arearesponsefunctionas:
(8) A = A. P=
and a yieldresponsefunctionas:
(9) Y= y~ pi S6
where m and 6 are respectively the elasticities of area responseand
yieldresponse(Y = = + 0 and20 = A. Ye), the relationsbetweenA
A’ and Y and Y’ are:
(lo)
(11)
have:
(12)
ReplacingEquations(4) and (6) for Q and Z in Equation(2)we
From Equat~,o~]s (1) and (12)we obtainthe formulaused t.o calculatethe
equilibrium priceof rice in Japanunderthe hypothesized conditions:
(13)
The hypothetical area,yieldand productioncan be calculated with P’
by Equatiotls (]0),(11),and (7),respectively.19
Estimationof Parameters —
The problemis now to obtainempiricalestimates of fivepara-
meters: elasticity of arearesponseto price ( m ); elasticity of
yieldresponseto price ( @ ); elasticity of supplYwith respectto
price ( Y ); the elasticity of supplYwith respectto the seed improve-
ment index( d ); and thepriceelasticity of demandfor rice ( ~,).
The estimateof the priceelasticity of demand( n ) is
availablefromOhkawa’sclassical studyon the foodeconomyof pre-
war ~8pan*19/ His estimatesof the priceelasticity of demandfor
ricewere basedon householdsurveydata of 1931/32- 1938/39for the
urbanpopulation, and on 1920-38marketdata for the ruralpopulation.
Thoseestimatesdifferfor differentoccupational, regionaland in-
come groups,but clusteraroundthemode - 0.2. We will adopt- 0.2
as t,he elasticity of demandwith respectto price ( q ), sincethis
figureis also consistent with the variousestimatesof income
elasticityof demandfor rice.
The supplyparametersrepresentour own estimates.Apparently
no studyof supplyresponseof rice has hecn conductedin Japan. We
choseto estimatearea responseand yieldresponseseparately and to
obtainaggregatesupplYelasticity by addingthe area and yieldelas-
ticities. An important consideration in makingthisapproachis the
differencein the time lag requiredto make adjustments in response
to price changesbetweenthe areaand yieldresponses. The yieldre-
sponseis essentially a short-run phenomena, depending primarilyon
the time it takesto adjustvariousinputs,such as fertilizer, to a20
changein price. Area responseinvolvesa long-runadjustment period.
in Japan,areaplantedin uplandrice is negligible (lessthan5 per-
cent of the totalareaplantedin rice)and no competitive cropexists
for rice on paddylandduringthe summercropseason. Therefore, the
area plantedin rice is almostcompletely determined by the available
paddy fieldarea. It requiressubstantial investment to expandthe
paddyfieldarea (forexample,by shiftinguplandcrop fieldsto
paddyfields),becausesucha changein landuse must be accompanied
by an extention of the irrigation system. Becauseof the large
capitalinvolvedin
in the areaplanted
longer-run response
paddyfielddevelopment, the short-runresponse
to rice to a changein price is limited. The
may, however,be substantial.Becauseof the
significance of lagson the responseof area to
distributed lag modelof the Koyck-Nerlove type
area response. The basicmodelused is:
*
pricewe employa
for the analysisof
(14) at = so
‘=%-l +=cpc (t-l)
and
(15)
at - at-l=~(a~”’-at-l)
where at, pt and pet are the logarithmic transformations of area
plantedin rice,rice priceand the priceof competitive crops,respec-
tively. a; is the long-runequilibrium area (in logarithm) forI
certainlevelsof pt and pet. Equations(10)and (11)reduceto:
(16) at = ,Aao + ACCpt-l + Amc pc (t,-1) + (1 -A ) at-l
20/ whichwe will use for regression analysis.— The pricesof rice
employedin themodelsestimated were deflatedby the generalprice
indexwhich,to some extent,reflectsthe changesin the cost of
openingnew paddyfields. An important variablelackingfromollr
model is publicinvestment in riparianand irrigation works. [t is
assumedthatsuch
price trendsand,
21/ lag models.—
The yield
(17)
governmentinvestment is inducedin the long-runby
in thatsense,is incorporated intoour distributed
responsemodelis specifiedas:
Yt = f30+13pt+ ~s~
where Yt, pt and st are the logarithmic transformations of rice yield
per hectare,riceprice,and the seed improvement index,respectively.
For purposesof estimation we deflatedthe ricepriceby the fertilizer
price indexinorder to reflectthe changesin the price of themajor
currentinputitem.
The resultsobtainedfromestimating Equations(16)and (17)
by least, squaresare summarized in Table4. In arearesponsethe co-
efficients of the priceof competitive productswere nonsignificant,
and the estimation was repeatedafterdroppingthatvariable. The
estimatesof the responseof riceareawith respectto the priceof1’
I
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Footnotes- Table4.
e Variablesare at -log A:
h
areaplantedin rice (1000ha.);
Y~ — log Y~ : rice yieldper ectareplanted(m.ton$fpl - log
{P/1):unit farmpriceof ricedeflatedby generalprice Index(yen
per m. ton);p~ - log of calendaryeer averageof wholesalepr’i~
of rice deflatedby generalprice index(-per m. ton);p3 - log
of unit farm priceof rice of previousyear deflatedby fertilizer
price indexof currentyear (yenper m. ton);p — log of calendar
! year averageof wholesalepriceof rice of prev ous year deflated
by fertilizer price indexof currentyear (~per m. ton);p5 -
log of rice year (November Of previousyear to Ootoberof current
year) averageof rice deflatedby fertilizer price indexof current
Year (Yenper m. tOn); P6 -- log of January- July averageOf whole~
sale p~e of ricedeflatedby fertilizer price indexof currentyear
(yenper m. ton);pc — log of price indexof farmproductsexcept
rice deflatedby generalprice index;s - log of S: seed improve-
ment index.
Sourcesof’ data are in Table1 except--
Wholesalepricesof rice (Monthly pricesat FukagawaRiceMarketin
Tr)kyo) : NobufumiKa#o ted.),Nihon_ Ki$Q Tokei (BasicStatistics
oi JapaneseAgriculture)$ (Tokyo,Norin - SuisangyoSeisansei f@jo
Kaigi,1958), p. 514.
Fertilizer price index: [{azushi Ohkawa,~, ~. (cd.),~ Term
EconomicStatist i= of Ja~, (L’II?S), Vol. 9 (Tokyo:
Toyokeizaishirnposha, 1966),pp.~-193.
Price indexof farmproductsexceptrice: Priceindexesby major
commoditygroupsin LTES,Vol. 8, 1967,pp. 168-170,aggregated
with 1934-36valueweightsin~, Vol. 8, p. 78.
a. (Coefficient of pttil)+- (coefficient of at-l)
.,
b. (Coefficient of p~-1) # l-l - (coefficient of at-~)9_T
a
— (coef’ficinnt of at-l)
l24
rice are significant at or near the 5-percentlevel. The magnitudes
of the pricecoefficients are smalland the coefficients of the
laggedindependent variableare closeto one, indicating that the
short-runresponseto price in areaplantedin rice is very small;but
the long-runresponseis relatively large. Thiswas the expected
resultconsidering the longtimerequiredto adjustthe paddyfield
area. The long-runelasticity, allowing infinitetimeadjustment,
is in the orderof 0.4-0.6. Such
the resultsof estimation of area
cou!ltries.Z/
The pricecoefficients in
estimates are not incompatible with
response elasticityin otherAsian
theyieldresponseregressions are
positiveand significant at or near the 5 percentlevel. The seed
improvement indexvariableis alsohighlysignificant.The priceco-
efficients, especially in caseof (Y - 1), is very consistent with the
resultsobtainedin a studyof fertilizer demandobtainedin an earlier
23/ studyby lIayami.— I.n thatstudy,the estimatesof the elasticity
of demandfor fertilizer with respectto the priceof fertilizer
relativeto thepriceof farmproductscenteraround1.5 and the esti-
mates of’ the elasticity of riceproductionof fertilizer center
around0.15. Considering the ratioof rice production to totalagri-
culturalproductionin valuetermsis about0.55,those estimates
implythat thepriceelasticity of rice yieldresponseto riceprice
is around0.12 (=1.5x 0.15x 0.55),which is compatible with the
resultsof directestimationin Table3.25
From the resultsof the estimation of the yieldresponserela-
tionwe decidedto adopta yieldresponseelasticity( @
a seed improvement elasticity ( ~ ) oi’ 3.0. The problem
on an appropriate arearesponseparameter( a ) fromthe
) 01’ 0.1 and
ol’ deciding
resultsof
estimation of the distributed lag arearesponsemodelis more diffi-
cult. The modelprovidesus with a short-runelasticity (allowing
one year adjustment period)and long-runelasticity(allowing in-
finiteadjustment period),neitherof which is adequatefor our
purpose. The span of timewe are concerned with is the 20 years
from 1915to 1935. We chosetenyearsas the averageadjustment
period,and selectedto use an arearesponseelasticity(= ) of 0.1,
basedon the rangeof resultsshownin the lastcolumnof Table3.
It shouldbe recognized that this is a convention adoptedfor com-
putationease. It has some intuitive appealbut littletheoretical
justification.
The resultsof applyingthe specifiedparametersto the
previousmodelare summarizedin Table5.mnQ .-l
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III. Findingsand Implications
The resultsin Table5 are plottedin Figures3 and 4 in order
to make comparisons betweenactualand hypothetical growthpathsof
Japaneserice economy.
Figure3 showsthat thedeclinein the rateof growthin the
seed improvement indexand the increasein the importsof colonial
rice explainsmost of the declineb the rate of growthin riceyield
and production duringthe interwar period. TMe ratesof growthin
hypothetical yieldand production declinedslightlyfrom 1890-1920
to 1920-1935, but it is unlikelythatanythingresembling the
“epochal”changein the rate of growthof actualrice production would
have occurredif importshad been held at the 1913-17levelrelative
to production, and the seed improvement indexhad continuedto riseat
the 1890-1920 rate (Case2). The slightdeclinein the growthrates
even in Case 2 couldbe accountedfor by the structural changes
affectingthe demandfor ricementionedin Section1. Neitheris it
necessaryto invokeunderestimation in rice production statistics in
the earlierperiod,as claimedby Nakamura,nor to invokefailureof
industrial capacityto produceinputs,as suggested by Rosovsk~,to
explainthe declinein the rateof growthin riceproduction during
the interwar period. It is also clearthat importsof rice from the
colonialareas(Case1) is not,by itself,an adequateexplanation for
the declinein the rateof growthof rice productionin the interwar
period. The “technology gap” betweenthe exploitation of the yield
gainsfrom the diffusionof the superiorvarietiesof farmers’28
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selections and the introduction of’the new experiment stat, iofi
varietiesalso exerteda signific~nt impacton dampeningthe rate of
growthof riceproductiori in Japanduringthe interwarperiod.
l%e influence of the rice importsdid exerta sizableimpact
OR ricepricesand on tlie incomesOf riceproducersi;! Japan. Under
the assumption of Case 1 production went up lessrapidlythanduring
1890-1920, while the internaltermsof tradefor rice improvedand the
real incomeof’ farmersfromricerose after1920as rapidlyas before
1920. Even ilT Case 2, where importsare heldat the 1913-17ratioand
yield technology represented by seed improvement is assumedto continue
at the earlierrate,the termsof tradeimprovedgradually, except
duringthe depression, and the real incomesof riceproducersrose
significai]tly over the period1920-1935in col:trast to almostno change
ur.der the cok}dition thatactuallyprevailed.
1:1an economywhich is closed,in the sensethat thereis no
international] trade,a~d in which thereis no technological progress
and no capitnlaccumulation in agriculture, industrieliza~ion and econ-
omic growthwill eventuallylead to a poiut that the termsof trade
~~e~eri~rate for industryand the supplypriceof laborfrom af~r.iculture
to industry will rise in ~erms of industrial products - - the “shortage
24/
point” of Rar,is and Fei.— Japanwas able to prolongthe arrivalof
this pointby exploiti-ng the techr]ological potentialin the traditional
peasantagriculture untilWorldWar I. Industri.aI development was
25/ supportedbY the very elasticsupplYof laborfromagriculture.—
Colonialpolicyseems to have beerr designedtopostponethearrival of31
the “shortage poi]]t” furtherand to make theprogressof indus[rializa -
tier’: ensierbY expandirig t,he supplyof rice in thedomesticmarket
throughimports from the colrrnies, SuccessOf thispolicykept the
industrial vlage low and t.]ie competitive positionof industrial products
strongiII the it]ternational market. If the same amountof ricewere
suppliedfrom foreigncountries, preciousforeignexchangewould have
bee~] drainedsignificantly and the importof capitalgoodsshouldhave
been curtailed.
This successwas a mixedblessingfor Japan. lt. depressedthe
price and the
orders in the
made this soc
for the i]lvas
incomeof farmersand contributed to serioussocialdis-
agricultural sector. The so-calledmilitaryreformists
al uneasir~ess and disorderamongfarmersthe springboard
on of Manchuriain 1931and the othermilitaryadventures
[t~]lich f~~]~wed, The policydecisionconcerningthe rice supplYafter
the Rice Riot irl 191,0 had thusUOt on],y economicbut vas~ socialand
26/ politicalimplicatirrl]s,-—
Why did the ecOnOmiceffectsof cOlOnialdevelopmertt pdic.y
fai], in Japancto prr)ducti the “classical” resultsassociated with
the importation of cheapgrain intoEnglandfrom colonialareasand
otherareasof new settlementin the 19thCentury? The answ@rseems!
at least in part,to be associated with the differentstructureof
agriculture and the differentpatternof industrial developmentin
the twocountries when the policiesof dependenceon overseassources
of food supplywas initiated.32
The inflowof cheapgrainto Englandfollowingthe repealof
the Corn Laws in 1846was accompanied by the continuing absorption of
labor intothe industrial sectorand a transformation of the agricul-
turalsectorawayfrom grainproduction and towarda more extensive
2i’/ systemof livestock agriculture.— The transformation was facili-
tatedby risingincomesin the industrial sectorwhichstimulated the
28/ demandfor theproductsof an animalagriculture.—
A n~mberof obstaclesimpededJapan to achievea similaragri-
culturaltransformation in responseto risingimportsand declining
pricesof grainduringthe interwar period. Japaneseagriculture was
rigidlylockedintoa sophisticated laborintensive systemof crop
production, highlydependenton irrigation and fertilizer as leading
inputs.~’ Therewas not a fullyadequatebasis,in eitheragricul-
turalresearchor i~dustrial infrastructure, to make a rapidtrans-
formationfromgrainproduction to a more diversified agricultural
system. More criticalwas thatthe rise in imports of grain was not
accompanied, in Jap~n,by rapidgrowthin the demandfor laborby the
industrial sector. The demandfor laborin the industrial sector
slackenedafter1920as a resultsof (a) contraction of world demand
for the productsof JapaneseindustryafterWorldWar f.,(b) contrac-
tionof domesticdemanddue to the deflation policyadoptedto permit
a returnto the gold standardat a prewarparity,(c) the adoptionof
an industrial rationalization policyin an attempt to stay competit.
in world markets. This policy placed major emphasis on attemptst.o
increaseproductivity and to savelaborthroughmore capitalintens.
ve
Ve33
30/ methodsof production,— Finally,incomelevelsin theurban indus-
trial sector of the Japanese economy
largeincreasein the demandfor the
agriculture.
The conditions which lead to
duri;]g tile i]lterwar periodhavebeen
Tile applica~ion of modernbiological
remainedtoo low to createa
productsof a more diversified
agricultural stagnation in Japan
reversedsinceWorldWar 11.
science,particularly post-
Nendeliangenetics,in agricultural researchhas sharplyraisedagri-
culturalproductivity potentials.New technological potential,
accumulated graduallyundertheAssignedExperiment System(initiated
in 1926),beganto exerta majorimpacton agricultural production in
the postWorldWar 11 period, JapanemergedfromWorldWar 11 with
a]? adequal.e industrial infrastructure to providethe fertilizer and
otheragricultural chemicalsneededfor a modern labor intensive bio-
chemical agricultural technology. Since World War 11 thishas been
complemented by the capacityof the engineering and machineryindus-
triesto introduce an efficient smallscalemechanical technology
suitedto the factorproportions of Japaneseagriculture.Incentives
for rapidrealization of the new agricultural potentialhavebeen re-
inforcedby highpricesupportsfor agricultural commodities, particu-
larlyrice,ar~d b.y modifications in the tenure system, which strengthen
the impact of the price incentives on farm management decisions.
i3.Ythe mid 1960’sevidence was emergingto supportan argument
that the shiftin directionof agricultural policymay representan
over-compensation for the errorsof the interwar period. The highprice supportfor rice,at more thandouble tli~ worldprice,and the
subsidiesfor paddydevelopment are restilting in surplusproduction
at a tir,le when t}le pricesof rice,and otherfoodgrail;s, in the
worldmarketare declining. The restrictions on growthof farmsize
under the landreformlegislation have beendiscouraging the intro-
ductionof laborsavingmechanical technology at a timewhei: labor
shortagesare beginningto emergeas a permanentfeatureof the
Japaneseeconomy. It is too earl,y to be overlyconfident of the
long-runeffectof thesepolicieson Japaneseagricultural develop-
ment. The uniquesuccessof Japaneseagricultural development over
the longrun, has been due to the effectiveresponseof Japanese
agricultural scientists, the agricultural supplYindustries, and farm
operatorsto pricerelationships which have accurately reflectedthe
31/ resourceendowments and factorproportions of the Japaneseeconomy.—
It appearsthe presentpoliciesare inducinga significant malalloca-
~io~~ of nationalresources.,Today Japanshouldlearnfrom the exper-
ienceof free tradeand agricultural transformation of the 19th
$enturyEngland.
The policiesassociated with the JapaneseagricLiltural stag-
n~tionduringthe interwar periodare also of significance for de-
velopmentpolicyin many of the lessdevelopedeconomiesof Southand
SoutheastAsia. Thesenationsare attempting to utilizethe new agri-
culturalproduction potentialsassociated with the “GreenRevolution”
32/ as a basisfor sustainedeconomicgrowth.- The problemof converting
currentor potentialfood surplusesintoa basisfor sustainedeconomic35
growthposesan extremely difficult problemfor most countries of South
and SoutheastAsia duringthe nextdecade. The continuing declineof
exportopportunities and pricessharplyreducesthe opportunity to use
surplusproductionto earn the foreignexchangeneededto finance
domesticdevelopment.Furthermore, the relatively largeshareof the
populationengagedin agricultural production and the slow (absolute)
growthin non-farmemployment opportunities limitsthe economicgains
thatcan be realizedby usingthe surpluses primarilyto support
employmentin the urban-industrial sectors,unlessthe transferof
surplusesis alsoaccompanied by lowerfoodprices.
Thus, if Japanand otherdevelopedcountries do not adopt
lessprotectionist policieswith respectto theirdomesticagricul-
ture,the economies of Southeast Asia are likelyto facedifficulties
duringthe 1970’ssimilarto thosefacedby theJapaneseeconomydur-
ing the interwar period. The maindifferenceis thatthe downward
pressureon ricepricesin thesecountries will comefrom increased
suppliesgefierated from internalratherthancolonialsources. The
problems(a) of rnaintai::ing sufficient equityin incomedistributions
bothwithintile ruraleconomyand betweenthe ruraland urban sectors
and (b) of generating sufficient internal demandto absorbthe produc-
tive capacityof an expandi[~g urbansectorwhilesimultaneously using
lowerrice pricesas a devicefor transferring the gainsof agricul-
turalproductivity intocapitalformation and economic growthin the
urban-industrial sectorwill requireextremeskill. It may also gen-
eratemore socialtensionthan thepoliticalstructures of many South
al~d s~utl~eas~ Asia]: economiesseem able to absorb.36
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had alreadyapproached a technicallimitof intensification,
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A somewhat similarphenomena occurredduringthe 1890-1905
period. Increasein the supplY(andpresumably consumption)
of rice outpaceddomesticproduction, althoughthe 1905
(1903-07 average)observation includestheabnormal.Years of
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-OJ). ‘Me factthatJapan
shiftedfrhm a net exporterto a net importerof riceduring
the lastdecadeof tne ninetet?nth centurypressedthe govern-
ment to‘take measuresto encourageagricultural production
includingthe establishment of The NationalAgricultural
Experiment Station(lti96), the Law of StateSubsidyfor Pre-
fecturalAgricultural Experiment Stations(1899)and the
ArableLand Replotment Law (1899). With the existence of
indigenous technological potentialthatwas not beingfullY
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per nectareduringtne firsttwo decadesof this cerltury
(~igure2). AS a resuitJapaneseagriculture continuedto
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the 1920-1935 period). Population continuedto grow at an
annualrateof about1.0 percentfor bothperiods. This
stagnation of per capitarice consumption, if due to a de-
cline in demand,mightbe expectedto havea significant
influence on production and productivity trends,although
in ~n open economydomesticconsumption does not represent
a directconstraint on domesticproduction.Analysisin the
preseilt paper indicates the stagnation of domesticrice pro-
ductionand productivity in Japancan be consistently eX-
plainedby two majorfactors,the exhaustion of’indigenous
technological potential and the importation of colonial
rice. Thisdoes uot,however, refutethe hypothesis that
demandcontraction may havealso contributed to the decline.
Quantitative anaiysisof the influence of demandcontraction
on domesticrice production duri]~g thisperiodawaitsa future
analysis.19/
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tion and water control. This would increase national wealth
and might also result in increase in government revenue under
an appropriate tax system. Whether the present distributed
lag specification oi’ geometric convergence is adequate for
describing this process is, 1 of course, open to challenge.
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82 (August 1968), pp. 380-402.
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co~onial development policies had been accompanied by land re-
form and other economic democratization measures similar to
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agricultural production by increasing the incentives of farmers,
(b) improvedtile levelof incomeand living01 farmers and con-
tributed to social and political stability of the rural sector
and (c) expanaedtile domesticmarketfor industrial products
tilrougn tile iucreased consumption of farmersand depressed
incentives to the imperialistic expansion of overseasmarket.
On the otherhand the impr~vedlevel of i~~comeand consumption
oi’ iarmers might ilave depressed industrial growtil by (a) de-
creasing the net outflow of savings from agriculture to
industry and (b) shifting upwards the sohedule of labor supplY
to industry, which was determined by the level oi living in
the rural sector, with the possible rise in industrial wage
rate. More extensive analysis is required to evaluate the
overall eii’ects of alternative land tenure policies on econ-
omic growth and socialand political development.
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duringthe two decadesIollowingthe repealof the Corn Laws.
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